If the State has to retain its democratic foothold in the region where the Maoists have established their firm presence, it has to prove the credibility of its governmental services by reaching out to the people, particularly those who have remained not only economically deprived but are also exposed to social injustice in a very stark manner. But as the things stand now, the State’s administrative machinery cannot reach out to these people as it is unable to establish the rule of law in the face of the Maoist’s guerilla-style violent operations. Hence, while a multi-pronged approach is necessary, the first priority at this juncture appears to be a counterinsurgency strategy followed by an effective developmental plan free of corruption that also addresses social justice.
A Counter-guerilla Strategy:
Though the Maoist rebels are presently in the stage of strategic defense and far from the mode of strategic offence, they have managed to kill a large number of security personnel and arm themselves heavily by looting arms from them by well-planned guerilla attacks. Between 2005 and 2010, they mounted successful attacks on Jahanabad district jail (13 november,05, 13 weapons looted), Rani Bodili police post in Chhattisgarh (15 March, 07, 56 security personnel including 35 SPOs massacred), Nayagarh town in Orissa (15 February,08, policemen killed, district armoury looted,1200 weapons along with a large quantity of ammunition taken away), Orissa border (29 june,o8, 39 greyhound force personnel killed and weapons taken away. The greyhounds had moved into the area from Andhra Pradesh without coordinating with Orissa police), Malkangiri , Orissa (16 July, 08, 17 policemen killed in mine blast), Chhattisgarh, Rajnandgao police district (12 July,09, 30 policemen including SP Rajnandgao killed), Gadhricholi district, Maharashtra (October, 2009, 34 policemen killed), Silda, West Bengal (14 February, 2, 2010, 24 policemen killed and their camp burned down), Chintalnar-Tarmetla in Dantewada district of Chhattishgarh (6 April, 2010, 74 CRPF personnel killed and their arms looted.). The Maoists seem to have in place a human intelligence system organized amongst the rural supporters to get accurate information regarding the condition of security camps and movement of security personnel. On the other hand, the security personnel’s movements were mostly clumsy, their camp defenses poor and alertness wanting. The security forces have to adopt counter-tactics learning from the tactics of the Maoist. Ganapathy said, “By adopting strictly secret methods of functioning and fool-proof underground mechanisms, by enhancing our mass base, vigilance and local intelligence, smashing enemy intelligence networks and studying their plans and tactics, we hope to check further losses.” This is also a lesson also for security forces.
To halt the forward march of the Maoists, it is imperative that a well Coordinated Counter-Guerilla Strategy is devised with unity of approach by all the affected states under the Centre’s watchful guidance instead of mounting piecemeal uncoordinated operations as is being done at present by each affected state. For this purpose, the states will have to raise special police forces but they should be given training of the same standards and they should be trained together in centrally funded counter-guerilla training academies. There should be an Apex Coordinating Operational Mechanism amongst the concerned states’ police administrations and a senior representative from the Centre should be a part of it with the convergence of communication network at all levels of operation and a Standing Operational Procedure with a clearly defined command structure. The operations should be conceived as borderless so that when need arises the security force of one state can move within another state’s border in pursuit of an objective without procedural wrangle but communicatively in touch so that the task can be handed over to the jurisdictional force as soon as possible (this may require some amendment in the procedural law.) Most of these operations will be in commando style and arms and equipments should be befitting the task. Intelligence will be an important component of this strategy. In this respect, a leaf can be taken from the seminal work of Lt Colonel Sir Julian Paget’s ‘Counter-insurgency Campaigning’ where he set six principles for effective intelligence. The two vitally important for the present purpose are (a) the intelligence organization should be fully integrated, under one chief of intelligence (b) intelligence must be worked for and not waited for. Another important suggestions made by him is that the cooperation of the people is a tremendous asset and every effort should be made to win this support. For this, the security forces need to be conscious of human rights of common people and should avoid knee-jerk response to provocations by the rebels. Some media report has suggested that the Maoists rebels have now been using Global Information System and Google maps, which needs verification. It needs to be examined if a communication satellite can be used for counter-guerilla operations to locate hideouts and movements of the rebels in interior areas. Mobile GPS with GIS can be a useful tool for the security forces during their operational movements. These can be force multipliers. Conventional operations engaging a large force is likely to be disastrous. Small dedicated forces with swift commando style operations backed by reliable intelligence will be more successful.
Development and Social Justice:
The report ‘Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas’ submitted by an Expert Group in 2008 to the Planning Commission (constituted in 2006 under the chairmanship of D.Bandopadhyay, Executive Chairman, Council for Social Development) has this important observation to make regarding challenges in Naxalite affected areas, “Poverty does create deprivation but other factors like denial of justice, human dignity cause alienation resulting in the conviction that relief can be had outside the system by breaking the current order asunder.” Poverty in Adivasi land is acute, but more than that they are alienated from their ancestral land under conditions created by the country’s developmental paradigm. India’s voracious production need encroaches into their world throwing them out of their land without adequate economic compensation and with psychological sense of loss. The Maoists fully exploit this sense of alienation. The Expert Committee report deals with many kinds of social discrimination and large-scale human rights violations against the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes in its report. It further observes, “the contradiction between the tribal community and the state itself has become sharper, translating itself into open conflict in many areas.” In the North-east, it has assumed the form of ethnic insurgency and in the 5th schedule areas, the Maoists are organizing the Adivasis for ‘people’s war.’ The Expert Committee refers to a study conducted by Dr Walter Fernandez which shows that from 1947 to 2004, around 60 million persons have been displaced due to various developmental projects involving 25 million ha. of land , which includes 25 million ha. of forest land and 6 million ha. of other Common Property Resources (CPR). Whereas the tribals constitute 8.08% of country’s population, they constitute 40% of the total displaced/affected people. The Committee has made specific recommendations in respect of developmental challenges in these areas in the chapter 5 of their report. Without elaborating on those recommendations, we will suggest that the Government prepare an Action Plan most expeditiously on the basis of these recommendations.
No doubt, in the context of large-scale violence, a well-planned counter- guerrilla strategy has to be adopted but it is not just a law and order matter. The developmental need has to be visibly met and social justice has to be assured. When some areas are cleared from Maoist influence through security force’s operations, these areas must not experience a vacuum on developmental and social justice fronts and must witness prompt developmental results. Good governance needs to be established. We suggest the following steps in particular:
(1) It is time to form task forces for Maoist-affected areas with adequate authority to take prompt decisions on development and to establish a leak-proof delivery system.
(2) The Centre should form a special Zone comprising the entire Maoist-affected region and place it under a separate department in the Ministry of Home Affairs for focused attention to the region-specific issues.
(3)Panchayat Raj should be extended to the 5th Schedule areas for empowerment of the people at the grassroots and to ensure their involvement and participation in their own development.
___________________________________________________________________________________
*1. Christoph Von Furer-Haimendorf, the famous anthropologist & ethnologist wrote in his book, ‘Tribes of India”(OUP), first published in 1982, “Most of the riverside villages between Bhadrachallam and Kunavaram are now inhabited almost entirely by non-tribals, the original Koya inhabitants having withdrawn away from the river…(But) in the vicinity of Kunavaram the process of land alienation can still be observed. In Rupaka, for instance, a village some ten kilometers inland from Kunavaram, nearly all of the 125 householders are Koyas, but 30 percent of the land is leased to non-tribals. The largest leaseholder is a Muslim who cultivates 60 acres.In the late 1960s he came as a penniless pedlar to Kunavaram, where he opened a small grocery shop and sold goods to tribals on credit. By 1977 he had become rich, and had built a two-storyed house in Kunavaram, part of which was –ironically- rented by the Integrated Tribal Development Agency.” (page 71, 1994, paperback.) The writer comments on the same page, “The Land Transfer Act 1917 stood in the way of outright purchases, but did not prevent the leasing of tribal land, and leases often turned into permanent occupation by non-tribals.”
*The writer is a former Director General of Police, Assam and a member of NSAB.
Harekrishna Deka, (b. 1943) Eminent Assamese poet, fiction writer, critic, editor, and the recipient of Sahitya Akademi Award (1987), Katha Award (1996), Assam Valley Literary Award (2010) and Padmanath Bidyabinod Award (2015); has nine collections of poems, six volumes of short stories, five books of literary criticism, two novels, two edited books, two books of social criticism and one collection of translated poems to his credit; has served as the editor of the English daily ‘The Sentinel’ and the Assamese literary magazine ‘Goriyoshi’. Starting his professional career as a college teacher, he has served as the Director General of Police and a member of the National Security Advisory Board.
Leave a Reply